



## Forum International de Dakar

sur la Paix et la Sécurité en Afrique

## Dakar International Forum

on Peace and Security in Africa

### Plenary 1 - An integrated approach to defence, security and peace

#### Background

The threats facing Africa—armed conflicts, humanitarian crises, violent extremism and cross-border crime—are merging and multiplying. They are compounded, moreover, by economic difficulties and climate change.

Consequently, African countries and their partners must develop an integrated approach to security, based on cooperation and greater subsidiarity between the national, regional, continental and global levels.

In this context, national defence and security forces must be considered as a whole (including the armed forces, police, *gendarmerie*, and customs authorities). Obstacles to the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—which was proposed by the African Union (AU) and is based on security integration between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs)—must be identified and then removed. Effective cooperation mechanisms between the RECs, the AU and the UN must also be reinforced.

#### General objective

Integrate the strategies of the various organisations actively involved in peace and security in Africa: UN, EU, AU, RECs and other multilateral initiatives.

#### Discussion points:

1. What approaches, tools and resources should be implemented to improve defence and security integration?
2. What is the best way to support the AU's capacity-building projects?
3. How to reconcile the institutional approach with new initiatives



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### **Workshop 1 - Peacekeeping: How to improve UN/EU/AU/REC provisions**

#### **Background**

Several new initiatives were developed in 2017 which are likely to bring significant changes to the peacekeeping strategy in line with the new international context and new threats, such as terrorism in particular.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres has confirmed his commitment to implementing a strategic reform of peacekeeping operations (PKOs), based on an analysis of their missions, resources and partnerships with governments and other international stakeholders. From the Brahimi report in 2000 to the High-Level Independent Panel's report in 2015, the United Nations has been engaged in a long process of peacekeeping reform, which, at this stage, is struggling to produce satisfactory results.

Africa lies at the crux of the issue: 8 of the 15 UN PKOs are in Africa. With a budget of \$8 billion for the 2016-2017 financial year, the PKOs together mobilise 44,000 African troops and police officers.

To provide high-calibre human resources, African countries often need financial and technical assistance, particularly from the UN and the European Union. Despite pressure from the new American administration to reduce the USA's financial contribution to UN PKOs, regular, long-term funding is vital to sustain peace in Africa.

The United Nations has a more sophisticated peace and security partnership with the African Union than with any other regional organisation. Under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the AU is involved in peacekeeping operations either alongside the UN (the transfer of authority from MISCA to MINUSCA in the Central African Republic), directly (the African Union Mission in Somalia - AMISON) or through its support of multinational initiatives (multinational joint task force against Boko Haram).

In his report on reforming the African Union, adopted at the Kigali Summit in July 2016, Rwandan President Paul Kagame stressed the urgency of reducing the AU's financial dependence on foreign lenders and the necessity of improving relations between the AU and RECs. Indeed, the latter are assuming more and more of the responsibility for establishing and maintaining peace, either through operations such as ECOMIB, AFISMA and MICEGA (for the ECOWAS) and MICOPAX (for the ECCAS), or by playing a political mediation role.

The EU supports the AU and the RECs in their peacekeeping efforts, having funded African-led operations to the amount of €2 billion since 2004, via its African Peace Facility (APF).

### **General objective**

Develop solutions to ensure the consistency and complementarity of the peacekeeping mechanisms adopted by the UN, the AU, the EU and the RECs, with a view to resolving conflicts in Africa. These solutions should also aim to consolidate the capacity-building economic model enabled by participation in UN PKOs, and to draw the maximum benefit from it in the African context.

#### **Discussion points:**

1. How to build a new global partnership for peace and security in Africa, based on a common vision shared by the main stakeholders
2. How to share the responsibility for commitments in a balanced and appropriate manner, taking into consideration the Charter of the United Nations, the need for Africa to take ownership of its peace and security, and the new forms of regional response
3. What innovative solutions are needed to finance peacekeeping operations in Africa?
4. How to enhance the sustainability of peace processes, and design better strategies for exiting peacekeeping operations in Africa
5. How to improve the rules of subsidiarity between the United Nations, the African Union and the RECs, hence boosting efficiency and enhancing relations with host countries



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### **Workshop 2 - What changes are needed to the EU's instruments to support security in Africa?**

#### **Background**

The fifth Africa-EU Summit, which is due to take place in Abidjan on 29 and 30 November 2017, aims to give “renewed impetus” to the 2007 strategic partnership between the European Union and Africa.

In view of the new security issues facing Africa, the European Union and the African Union aim to “reshape and deepen the Africa-EU partnership”. This partnership is equally strategic for Africa and for Europe, insofar as the threats are the same and affect security on both continents.

The European Union has supported security in Africa since it signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, by:

- conducting 19 civilian and military operations (five of which are still ongoing);
- providing funds of over €2 billion since 2004, through the African Peace Facility;
- further developing its programmes to support the fight against terrorism and radicalisation;
  - providing substantial support for the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture;
  - stepping up support for regional strategies;
  - implementing a programme of support for security system reform.

The main purpose of such measures is to strengthen the strategic security partnership between the AU and the EU, and also to improve intervention capabilities through financial and technical support from the EU.

The European Union has rationalised, reinforced and adjusted its approaches to reflect the new realities set out in the 2063 Agenda, APSA's 2016-2020 roadmap, and the Kagame and Kaberuka reports, the goal being to boost Africa's defence and security capabilities.

## **General objective**

Identify the changes that need to be made to the financial, technical and operational instruments developed by the EU to increase the capabilities of the AU and regional organisations, drawing on the lessons learned from the implementation of European missions and operations and the financing of African operations.

### **Discussion points:**

1. What can the EU do to meet the training and equipment needs of African defence and security forces?
2. How can the EU support regional organisations and new cross-border initiatives?
3. What are the vision and plans for a new EU peace and security instrument after 2020?
4. How to improve the coordination of support from European institutions and Member States



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### Workshop 3 - Maritime security and safety in Africa: International challenges

#### Background

Maritime insecurity is depriving African countries of revenue that is crucial to their development, and is affecting the safety of African people as a whole. Trade and business activities such as fishing and offshore hydrocarbon extraction are being disrupted by piracy and illegal fishing, while the increase in trafficking is destabilising local socio-political systems. Overfishing and pollution are causing serious food crises. The trafficking of arms, human beings, drugs and medication is fuelling the development of Mafia-like networks. These issues, which affect coastal countries in particular, have more or less direct repercussions for the entire continent, as maritime insecurity is disrupting supply chains to remote inland countries.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2039, adopted in 2012, urges African sub-regional organisations to develop a strategy to introduce or reinforce anti-piracy legislation, in cooperation with the UN and other partners.

In January 2009, coastal states in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea regions adopted the Djibouti Code of Conduct, which aims to promote international cooperation in repressing piracy and supporting piracy victims. At the Yaoundé Summit in June 2013, the leaders of the ECOWAS and ECCAS member states adopted a similar code of conduct. In addition, to enable closer cooperation between countries in the Gulf of Guinea, a security architecture was created with command or coordination centres at the national, zonal, regional and interregional levels (Yaoundé ICC). However, a shortage of resources has delayed the introduction of the code of conduct, and the operationalisation of the Yaoundé architecture.

The African Union Extraordinary Summit on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa, which took place in Lomé in October 2016, tackled maritime security and safety issues through the prism of economic and social development, and environmental concerns. At the Summit, 31 out of 52 countries signed a strict charter aiming to reconcile the exploitation of natural resources and the regulation of maritime

activities with sustainable development and safety goals. The charter must now be ratified by at least 15 countries before it can come into force.

Finally, special attention may also be accorded to port facilities, which—while they provide gateways to the wider continent and generate substantial wealth—are also a source of risk. They are crucial points of contact between the sea and inland regions, and generate a significant proportion of government resources. Port facilities form the backdrop of many security issues such as smuggling, illegal immigration, and human trafficking networks. They are also vulnerable to terrorist attacks and to industrial security threats.

### **General objective**

Seek ways to strengthen the collective response to maritime security challenges in Africa, particularly through the operationalisation of existing African cooperation mechanisms (the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Yaoundé architecture, the Lomé Charter), the coordination of international partners, and relations with private stakeholders.

#### **Discussion points:**

- 1- How to promote development and ensure the security of international trade in African waters
- 2- How can the global fight against maritime insecurity (including more than just counter-piracy efforts) be made more effective?
- 3- How to integrate environmental issues into measures to increase maritime security
- 4- How can partners from all over the world, as well as from inland regions, be more closely involved in the maritime security policies of coastal states?



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### Conference 1 - Support and funding for SSR programmes in Africa

#### Background

Security Sector Reform (SSR) means strengthening institutions and the rule of law, within the frame of a multidimensional approach. It therefore involves a broad spectrum of public- and private-sector, civilian and military, and national and international stakeholders. Following several reports by the Secretary-General, the United Nations confirmed in SC Resolution 2151 (2014) that SSR is a '*core element ... of peacebuilding*'. The African Union Commission adopted a policy framework on Security Sector Reform in 2013. The European Union — which helps to strengthen African national capabilities through six civilian and military training and SSR missions (EUTMs and EUCAPs) — is participating in this reform process and reframing its strategies and instruments. These projects will be discussed at the EU-Africa Summit in Abidjan on 29 and 30 November 2017.

The implementation of these reforms in Africa is impeded by several factors relating to the inadequate consideration of specific national contexts, poor coordination between the numerous stakeholders, and the crucial issue of financing.

SSR is a long process, and ownership of the reform by the government and national stakeholders is essential to its success. When defining SSR strategies, it is important to take stock of the situation and capabilities of the countries involved, and also to consider their specific cultural identity and their conception of security.


Financing is also a decisive factor in the success of security sector reforms, as it is essential to their sustainability over time. Lastly, the various international lenders and partners must more effectively overcome issues relating to the planning and coordination of reforms, in which national stakeholders must be closely involved.

#### General objective

Help to improve SSR processes in Africa by rethinking the way they are designed and implemented as core components of a crisis recovery plan and a peacebuilding process, strengthening the governance pillar to promote national ownership of them, and ensuring the sustainability and regularity of financing.

**Discussion points:**

1. How to ensure that the countries benefiting from the SSR are more closely involved in its definition?
2. How to remove the obstacles to SSR processes?
3. How could governments be supported in implementing SSR?
4. How to reconcile the strategies of the different international stakeholders involved in the SSR?
5. What integrated approach is needed for more efficient SSR?



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### Plenary 2 - Terrorism and the need for integrated solutions

#### Background

For two decades, Africa, like the rest of the world, has been dealing with the threat of violent extremism, characterised by its radical doctrine and modes of action, its endurance and wide territorial dispersion, and its Internet activism. This threat is embodied by the violent extremist groups and armed terrorist groups operating mainly in the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa.

The security response to this threat should take an integrated approach based on national, regional and international cooperation.

Counter-terrorism is not the exclusive domain of the defence and security forces: It also encompasses cybersecurity, measures to combat the financing of violent extremist and terrorist organisations, and the governance of information and cyberspace. In addition, it involves promoting the rule of law to build public support and increase the resilience of societies as a whole.

Lastly, parallel measures to prevent radicalisation are fundamentally important. Formal and informal local civil society structures (such as schools, associations, elected officials, community and religious leaders, etc.) should be closely involved in these measures.

#### General objective

Promote the development of multidimensional, multi-actor solutions to prevent and counter terrorism.

**Discussion points:**

1. What integrated strategies are needed to combat the financing of terrorism and violent extremism?
2. What avenues should be explored to more effectively integrate national, regional and international counter-terrorism strategies?
3. How can solutions be coordinated to improve the governance of cyberspace and hence combat terrorism in Africa?
4. How can resilience to terrorism and violent extremism be strengthened?



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### **Workshop 4 - Resilience and the rule of law in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism**

#### **Background**

Omnipresent security has shown its limits when it comes to preventing terrorism and violent extremism; however, the attacks and human rights violations perpetrated by terrorist groups (rape, human trafficking, torture, kidnapping) often push governments to resort to such emergency measures. Nevertheless, excessive reactions to terrorism can be counter-productive, and may increase public sympathy and support for terrorist groups.

Counter-terrorism laws may also create a public backlash if they serve as a pretext for violating rights and freedoms (arbitrary detention, torture, summary executions, sex crimes, security measures that breach international law, etc.). This is most likely to occur where social expectations are increasing.

In view of these facts, promoting the rule of law is an effective long-term solution to terrorism and violent extremism. It builds resilience by involving all actors in society, and places the emphasis on public information, education and awareness.

It also requires security sector reform to establish a better relationship between law enforcement agencies and the people they have to protect.

Strengthening the rule of law is beneficial at all stages of the fight against terrorism, from prevention to the neutralisation and judicial treatment of terrorist groups. Furthermore, such a strategy nullifies one of the fundamental arguments of terrorist propaganda.

#### **General objective**

Help strengthen the rule of law against terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, in order to increase public resilience.

**Discussion points:**

1. How to promote an inclusive and participatory approach to building resilience (involving defence and security forces, women, young people, faith groups, civil society and local communities)
2. How to strengthen the resilience of governments and populations through a counter-terrorism approach based on the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties
3. How to integrate issues relating to the rule of law into the global counter-terrorism strategies adopted by international partners
4. How to improve cooperation between governments and local and international organisations actively involved in human rights promotion, thereby reinforcing the rule of law



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### Workshop 5 - The fight against terrorist financing

#### Background

The adoption on 17 December 2015 of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2253, which contains measures to suppress the financing of terrorist groups, is an important strategic aspect of the fight against terrorism. It was introduced in an effort to cut off the numerous financing channels of terrorist groups.

It is worth noting that, while the cost of the terrorist act itself may be relatively low, preparing it requires substantial resources (to maintain networks and cells, recruit new members, develop propaganda, provide training and equipment, foster an enabling environment, etc.). Financing also provides terrorist groups with the much-used option of 'outsourcing' attacks and kidnappings to criminals who are much more driven by financial greed than by terrorist ideology. Therefore, the fight against terrorist financing focuses mainly on the structure, organisation and operation of terrorist groups.

While terrorist groups derive some of their financial resources from funds transfers, they are also known to be involved in the trafficking of drugs such as cannabis, cocaine and psychotropic substances, either directly or at least by protecting the traffickers. Groups connected with Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are among the wealthiest, and drug money accounts for a substantial proportion of their resources according to UNODC (annual report 2017); however, we do not, at this stage, have sufficiently detailed information on this illicit revenue.

Likewise, armed terrorist groups are able to raise "taxes" from the territories they control, and may offer to protect transhumant populations or to turn a blind eye to criminal trafficking (of protected species, drugs, human beings, and so on) in exchange for cash payment.

Resolution 2253 complements existing security measures and addresses the numerous financing strategies of terrorist groups. It also confirms the African Union's decisions against the funding of terrorism through ransom payments and criminal

activities, which were reiterated in a communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its 455<sup>th</sup> meeting on the prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism in September 2014.

For their part, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABI) are working together to identify the methods used by terrorists to collect, move and use funds. The exchange of financial information at the sub-regional level is therefore an important counter-terrorism tool. At the same time, the harmonisation and reinforcement of legal frameworks would align with new transnational trends.

### **General objective**

Help to integrate current national, regional and international strategies to more effectively combat the financing of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.

#### **Discussion points:**

1. What are the weaknesses in counter-terrorist financing strategies?
2. How to combine counter-terrorist and financial intelligence to increase the authorities' ability to uncover and investigate terrorist financial networks
3. How could countries work together, particularly in border areas, to iron out the existing flaws in strategies to combat terrorism-related economic activity
4. How to control economic activity in grey areas and safe havens for armed terrorist groups
5. How can specialist organisations and governments work together to combat terrorist financing?



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### **Workshop 6 - Cybersecurity and the governance of information and cyberspace**

#### **Background**

Massive government investment in digital development (infrastructure, e-administration) and the surge of new uses enabled by mobile internet have opened up unprecedented development prospects for Africa. However, poorly controlled hyperconnectivity has opened the door to new and constantly changing vulnerabilities and threats. Therefore, controlling cyberspace through the introduction of cybersecurity policies is now becoming a vital component of national security strategies.

Whereas cybercriminals in Africa have previously targeted economies in the North, they are now becoming more organised and are directly attacking local economies, resulting in major financial consequences. Cybercriminal organisations are made up of highly skilled people with national qualifications, who have become frustrated by the lack of opportunities in the labour market. In addition, the proliferation of offensive tools freely available on the Internet and the Darknet is spurring an upsurge of increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks.

Reflecting the trend in civil society, digital technology has also become a tool for terrorist groups to spread their propaganda, recruit new members, and raise funds. Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) and terrorists are aware of this situation and have turned cyberspace into a battlefield, and information and communication technologies (ICTs) into weapons.

Against a tense backdrop of counter-terrorism warfare, controlling digital content, detecting weak signals of radicalisation on social media, matching data with identities online, and tracing dematerialised financial transactions are all major challenges for security services.

Despite the increase in national initiatives to prevent cybercrime in Africa, the governance of cybersecurity is still too often inadequate, and is split between national

## ***Current security challenges in Africa: Seeking integrated solutions – 2017***

digital development agencies, telecoms regulators and national personal data protection commissions. The creation of national Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) was the first step towards developing operational cybersecurity capabilities, but has been slow to translate into concrete action.

Several African countries have signed up to the European Council's Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, which aims to harmonise legislation on cyberattacks, improve investigation techniques and promote cooperation between countries. However, it is not yet in operation due to delays in incorporating it into the various national bodies of law in Africa.


In 2014, the African Union also adopted a convention on cybersecurity and personal data protection (the Malabo Convention). It provides for public awareness measures and training for stakeholders, but has not yet been brought into force.

### **General objective**

Develop integrated solutions to improve cybersecurity and the governance of cyberspace.

#### **Discussion points:**

1. What integrated solutions are needed to improve sub-regional and regional cooperation in cybercrime prevention?
2. What financing and capacity-building mechanisms are required?
3. What can be done to improve cybersecurity management by governments and businesses in Africa?



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### **Conference 2 - The defence and security continuum: an integrated approach**

#### **Background**

Whereas previously coordination between defence and security was uncommon (occurring only during states of emergency or specific missions), the importance of the defence and security continuum has now become very clear. Indeed, the hybrid nature of current threats (terrorism, piracy, crime and large-scale trafficking) requires a global response, not only to defend territorial integrity and state institutions, but also to protect populations and national resources.

To do this, countries must develop effective cooperation and coordination between their various defence and security forces (intelligence services, armed forces, *gendarmerie*, police). This means improving the interoperability of their resources, staff and procedures. However, this approach must not conflict with different professional cultures and specific legal frames of reference.

The defence and security continuum concept can also be extended to include the justice and civil defence systems, the private sector and the general public, all of which have a role to play in dealing with the threats.


Looking beyond national borders, the defence and security continuum should encourage international cooperation to combat transnational threats more effectively. This conference will bring together various actors in the defence and security sectors, with a view to sharing their thoughts and experiences regarding the defence and security continuum, and promoting an integrated approach at the regional and continental levels.

#### **General objective**

Help to increase synergy and cooperation across the defence and security spectrum, with a view to developing an integrated approach.

**Discussion points:**

1. What are the issues and challenges connected with the defence and security continuum in Africa?
2. How can the continuum stimulate cooperation between defence and security actors from different professional cultures and with specific legal frames of reference?
3. How to extend the continuum to promote cooperation between the general public and defence and security forces
4. How to establish a relevant system of coordination and cooperation, which does not undermine the complementarity of defence and security forces and of internal and external intelligence services
5. What are the obstacles to the intervention of defence forces in internal security, and how can these obstacles be overcome?



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### Plenary 3 – New security challenges facing Africa

#### **Background**

One of Africa's major security challenges continues to be the spread of terrorism, compounded by cross-border crime, such as the trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings, and by a lack of security in urban centres, which has increasingly spread into surrounding areas as well.

In response to this state of insecurity, several initiatives have been taken at national, regional and international levels, mainly in terms of strengthening security measures, fighting against terrorist funding, and building public awareness, particularly with the youth.

In order to establish sustainable peace and stability in Africa, a combination of both remedial actions and preventive solutions must be implemented to strike at the source of insecurity on the continent.

From this viewpoint, issues related to energy transition, population migration and humanitarian crises have been identified as causal or exacerbating factors for Africa's current security situation. These phenomena, although not new, have evolved and amplified, having significantly weakened the socio-economic fabric in certain regions. This has resulted in populations becoming more vulnerable, particularly the youth, who are then become easy targets for violent extremists.

#### **General objective**

Help to develop integrated solutions to security instability associated with energy transition, population migration and humanitarian crises.

#### **Discussion points:**

- 1- How has internal and external migration affected the overall security in Africa?
- 2- What are the major security challenges resulting from humanitarian crises in Africa?
- 3- What are the economic and security challenges associated with energy transition?
- 4- What integrated solutions should be implemented in the face of these new security challenges?



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### Workshop 7 – Integrated solutions to migration and security challenges

#### Background

Population migratory movements have been a global and continuous phenomenon. However, current African migratory movements have led to unprecedented security concerns on both a regional and worldwide scale. Although it is true that 2016 saw a flux of migrants moving from Africa into Europe, the fact remains that more than 70% of African migratory movements are intraregional. Migratory flows on the continent have been a long-standing structural trend, and are of particular concern in West Africa. The focus on migration issues must extend beyond simply the interests of receiving countries. It is crucial to consider the migrant's journey, from beginning to end, including the transit countries.

While some migrants are motivated by economic opportunities, an increasing number are being driven by security concerns. Natural disasters, resource shortages, war and armed conflict, massive human rights violations, and terrorism are all contributing factors to migration.

Hence, the collapse of Libya drove vast numbers of migrants, mostly from the Sahel region, into Europe, where some have been settled for a decade, or longer. The more recent developments are troublesome, with a rise in the number of women and minors and the proliferation of human trafficking networks and streams.

The security-focused response to the migration crisis in Africa has produced underwhelming results. In the wake of the inadequate handling of these challenges, smuggling and human trafficking networks have been thriving as the legal avenues for migration have been closing.

In the Joint Statement of the 2015 Valletta Summit, European and African member states committed to respecting human rights, improving legal frameworks, fighting against trafficking, and to addressing the structural causes of migration as part of their development cooperation policies. An emergency fund was also set up by the European Union to promote

stability and to confront the root causes of irregular migration and population displacement in Africa. Despite this progress, stakeholders in the North and South remain divided on some key points.


Although the African Union refers explicitly to the free circulation of people as a driver of regional integration in the 1991 Abuja Treaty, this is applied inconsistently through the various regional organisations. In fact, free circulation is often impeded by states in response to tensions between them. Finally, migrants often find themselves turned away due to xenophobic attitudes in populations living in transit and receiving countries.

### **General objective**

Identify solutions for strengthening the integration of international responses to the migration crisis in support of the countries of origin and transit.

#### **Discussion points:**

- 1- What integrated approaches should be implemented to reconcile the free circulation of people, migration and security?
- 2- How do we deconstruct the conflation of migration-related concepts, namely origin, religion, radicalisation and criminality?
- 3- How to promote the application of the Abuja Treaty and the Valletta Declaration
- 4- What is the most effective response to the handling of migrants in transit countries?



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### Workshop 8: Security, humanitarian crises and development

#### Background

Drought, famine, epidemics, natural disasters, and armed conflict form a breeding ground for humanitarian crises in Africa. The result is population exodus and humanitarian tragedies which can eventually lead to security repercussions. Populations become increasingly vulnerable, especially the youth, making them more susceptible to violent extremist discourse, which poses an additional security threat.

The link between security and development is a widely accepted consensus. However, concrete steps including a humanitarian dimension have yet to bring about the desired outcomes. Military spending was long considered a hindrance to development in Africa, where each dollar spent on security meant one less for development efforts and humanitarian crisis management. Plus, the introduction of any security-related aspects in development aid processes risked sparking accusations of interference in nations' internal affairs. Following the Cold War, however, new forms of conflict and violence put social balances at risk at the same time new economies began popping up in Africa. Taking into account all of these changes, the realisation that security is a global humanitarian concern has led to a better understanding of the factors involved in humanitarian crises. These factors cover, among others, food, health, environmental, individual, political, community and economic dimensions.

The current challenges facing Africa—the fight against extremists, securing supply channels, environmental threats, security system reforms, etc.—have raised the question of the role of security in aid and development policies.

Debates are underway, especially in the OECD and the EU but also in certain development agencies, with the aim of better coordinating, within a single framework, prevention, humanitarian crisis management, short-term post-crisis reconstruction and long-term development.

**General objective**

Strengthen the integration of crisis-response humanitarian, security and development initiatives put in place by public and private players in Africa and internationally.

**Discussion points:**

- 1- What is the current link between humanitarian crises and security challenges?
- 2- What are the endogenous solutions in response to the urgent humanitarian situations?
- 3- How to implement cooperation and assistance agreement mechanisms between African countries and the African Union more effectively in order to manage humanitarian crises
- 4- How to improve cooperation and optimise the complementarity of solutions to humanitarian and security crises in the short and long term



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### **Workshop 9: The economic and security challenges associated with energy transition**

#### **Background**

Climate change is a major challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century around the world, and Africa is no exception. The continent is among the most vulnerable regions facing the consequences of this environmental trend. This is why several states, during the COP21 conference, recognized the need for energy transition with the help of international funding collected through the Green Climate Fund. This absolutely crucial funding has been jeopardised by the USA's withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. The costs of adapting to climate change in Africa could reach between 5% and 10% of the continent's GDP.

Although expensive, energy transition is nonetheless essential for Africa's economic survival and security. Development models involving fossil fuels must be called into question with a view to the economy, the environment and security. These resources are, in fact, at the centre of conflict and geopolitical tensions, impeding any efforts to effectively counter development inequality. These models are unsustainable and actually accelerate the effects of climate change.

The environmental damage and growing shortage of resources have exacerbated threats and increased flows of migration, tightening the pressure on populations confined to increasingly limited areas. These factors weaken states' resilience and their ability to manage the many diverse consequences of climate change. When these factors are confronted by certain socio-economic conditions, we see the emergence of security risks.

Well aware of the magnitude of these challenges, several political institutions—UN Security Council, European Union and NATO—have stepped in. Similarly, the African Union has identified climate change as a threat to peace as part of its 2016-2020 African Peace and Security Architecture Roadmap.

**General objective**

Identify effective solutions to the major economic and security challenges associated with energy transition, while respecting states' sovereignty and their economic and social development imperative.

**Discussion points:**

- 1- How to integrate operational strategies into national development plans to face the consequences of climate change
- 2- How to set out concerted measures, within regional economic communities, to manage migration linked to climate change and pressure on resources
- 3- How to accelerate and coordinate renewable energy development in Africa, especially through public-private partnerships
- 4- Is energy transition a new form of ecological conditionality?



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## Dakar International Forum

on Peace and Security in Africa

### Conference 3 – Protecting companies: what is the role of public-private partnerships?

#### Background

Some countries in Africa have a very high security risk, but this risk is not solely the concern of the states themselves; safety challenges have also become a major concern among companies facing various threats such as terrorism, political and social instability, or public health problems. Companies can be fairly vulnerable depending on their line of business, whether strategic or not, and their nationality. They may be targeted by terrorist groups in order to garner media attention or to tap into a major funding source through hostage takings. Despite this sense of vulnerability, the momentum in various sectors is enticing companies to undergo and expand their activities on the continent.

In this context, companies have increasingly had to adopt additional safety measures to manage security risks. Many companies, especially from abroad, hire private security firms, whose sphere of operations and legal status should perhaps be of concern to states. A legal environment thus needs to be established to enable companies to operate in a secure setting. While they may be capable of ensuring their own security, these firms are no substitute for state services.

Some states in Africa are proposing, in certain cases, to work with businesses: they manage concerns by offering specific protection services to companies operating in areas deemed high-risk. This growing practice, which is especially common along the Sahel-Saharan strip, makes it possible for states to protect companies from terrorist threats and to maintain crucial business in dangerous regions.

#### General objective

Identify public-private partnership models to effectively ensure the protection of businesses and their activities in Africa while also respecting states' sovereign area of jurisdiction.

**Discussion points:**

- 1- How to encourage partnerships between states and businesses to better ensure security
- 2- How to best ensure the protection of sensitive sites and company personnel
- 3- How to attract and secure investments while also reinforcing both the physical and legal security of businesses and their activities
- 4- What is the role of private security companies?